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ABSTRACT
For U.S. annual data that include WWII, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is
0.4-0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6-0.7 over two years. If the change in defense spending is “permanent”
(gauged by Ramey’s defense-news variable), the multipliers are higher by 0.1-0.2. The estimated multipliers
are all significantly less than one and apply for given average marginal income-tax rates. We cannot
estimate reliable multipliers for non-defense purchases because of the lack of good instruments. Since
the defense-spending multipliers are less than one, greater spending crowds out other components
of GDP, mainly investment, but also non-defense government purchases and net exports. Consumer
expenditure on non-durables and services has only a small response. In a post-1950 sample, increases
in average marginal income-tax rates (measured by a newly constructed time series) have significantly
negative effects on GDP. When interpreted as a tax multiplier, the magnitude is around 1.1. When
we hold constant marginal tax rates, we find no statistically significant effects on GDP from changes
in federal tax revenue (using the Romer-Romer exogenous federal tax-revenue change as an instrument).
In contrast, with revenue held constant, increases in marginal tax rates still have a statistically significant
negative effect on GDP. Therefore, tax changes seem to affect GDP mainly through substitution effects,
rather than wealth effects. The combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that












charles.redlick@post.harvard.edu  The global recession and financial crisis of 2008-09 have focused attention on fiscal-
stimulus packages.  These packages often emphasize heightened government purchases, 
predicated on the view (or hope) that expenditure multipliers are greater than one.  The packages 
typically also include tax reductions, designed partly to boost disposable income and 
consumption (through wealth effects) and partly to stimulate work effort, production, and 
investment by lowering marginal income-tax rates (through substitution effects). 
  The empirical evidence on the response of real GDP and other economic aggregates to 
changes in government purchases and taxes is thin.  Particularly troubling in the existing 
literature is the basis for identification in isolating effects of changes in government purchases or 
tax revenue on economic activity.   
  This study uses long-term U.S. macroeconomic data to contribute to existing evidence 
along several dimensions.  Spending multipliers are identified primarily from variations in 
defense spending, especially changes associated with buildups and aftermaths of wars.  The 
defense-news variable constructed by Ramey (2009b) allows us to distinguish temporary from 
permanent changes in defense spending.  Tax effects are estimated mainly from changes in a 
newly constructed time series on average marginal income-tax rates from federal and state 
income taxes and the social-security payroll tax.   Parts of the analysis differentiate substitution 
effects due to changes in marginal tax rates from wealth effects due to changes in tax revenue. 
  Section I discusses the U.S. data on government purchases since 1914, with stress on the 
differing behavior of defense and non-defense purchases.  The variations up and down in defense 
outlays are particularly dramatic for World War II, World War I, and the Korean War.  Section II 
describes the newly updated time series from 1912 to 2006 on average marginal income-tax rates 
from federal and state individual income taxes and the social-security payroll tax.  Section III 2 
 
discusses Ramey’s (2009b) defense-news variable.  Section IV describes the Romer and Romer 
(2008) measure of “exogenous” changes in federal tax revenue.  Section V describes our 
conceptual framework for assessing effects on GDP from changes in government purchases, 
taxes, and other variables.  Section VI presents our empirical findings.  The main analysis covers 
annual data ending in 2006 and starting in 1950, 1939, 1930, or 1917.  Section VII summarizes 
the principal findings and suggests avenues for additional research, particularly applications to 
other countries. 
I.  The U.S. History of Government Purchases:  Defense and Non-defense 
  Figure 1 shows annual changes in per capita real defense or non-defense purchases 
(nominal outlays divided by the GDP deflator), expressed as ratios to the previous year’s per 
capita real GDP.
1  The underlying data on government purchases are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) since 1929 and, before that, from Kendrick (1961).
2  The data on 
defense spending apply to the federal government, whereas those for non-defense purchases 
pertain to all levels of government.  Our analysis considers only government spending on goods 
and services, not transfers or interest payments.  To get a long time series, we are forced to use 
annual data, because reliable quarterly figures are available only since 1947.  The restriction to 
annual data has the virtue of avoiding issues concerning seasonal adjustment. 
  The blue graph in Figure 1 shows the dominance of war-related variations in the defense-
spending variable.  For World War II, the value is 10.6% of GDP in 1941, 25.8% in 1942, 17.2% 
in 1943, and 3.6% in 1944, followed by two negative values of large magnitude, -7.1% in 1945 
                                                 
1Standard numbers for real government purchases use a government-purchases deflator that assumes zero 
productivity change for inputs bought by the government.  We proceed instead by dividing nominal government 
purchases by the GDP deflator, effectively assuming that productivity advance is the same for publicly purchased 
inputs as it is in the private economy. 
2The data since 1929 are the BEA’s “government consumption and gross investment.”  This series includes an 
estimate of depreciation of public capital stocks (a measure of the rental income on publicly owned capital, 
assuming a real rate of return of zero on this capital). 3 
 
and -25.8% in 1946.  Thus, World War II provides an excellent opportunity to estimate the 
government-purchases multiplier; that is, the effect of a change in government purchases on 
GDP.  The favorable factors are:  
  The principal changes in defense spending associated with World War II are plausibly 
exogenous with respect to the determination of GDP.  (We neglect a possible linkage 
between economic conditions and war probability.) 
  These changes in defense spending are very large and include sharply positive and 
negative values. 
  Unlike many countries that experienced major decreases in real GDP during World 
War II (Barro and Ursua [2008, Table 7]), the United States did not have massive 
destruction of physical capital and suffered from only moderate loss of life.  Hence, 
demand effects from defense spending should be dominant in the U.S. data. 
  Because the unemployment rate in 1940 was still high, 9.4%, but then fell to a low of 
1.0% in 1944, there is information on how the size of the defense-spending multiplier 
depends on the amount of slack in the economy. 
  The U.S. time series contains two other war-related cases of large, short-term changes in 
defense spending.  In World War I, the defense-spending variable (blue graph in Figure 1) 
equaled 3.5% in 1917 and 14.9% in 1918, followed by -7.9% in 1919 and -8.2% in 1920.  In the 
Korean War, the values were 5.6% in 1951, 3.3% in 1952, and 0.5% in 1953, followed by -2.1% 
in 1954.  As in World War II, the United States did not experience much destruction of physical 
capital and incurred only moderate loss of life during these wars.  Moreover, the changes in 
defense outlays would again be mainly exogenous with respect to GDP.   4 
 
  In comparison to these three large wars, the post-1954 period features much more modest 
variations in defense spending.  The largest values—1.2% in 1966 and 1.1% in 1967—apply to 
the early part of the Vietnam War.  These values are much smaller than those for the Korean 
War; moreover, after 1967, the values during the Vietnam War become negligible (0.2% in 1968 
and negative for 1969-71).  After the end of the Vietnam conflict, the largest values of the 
defense-spending variable are 0.4-0.5% from 1982 to 1985 during the “Reagan defense buildup” 
and 0.3-0.4% in 2002-2004 during the post-2001 conflicts under George W. Bush.  It seems 
unlikely that there is enough information in the variations in defense outlays after 1954 to get an 
accurate reading on the defense-spending multiplier. 
  The red graph in Figure 1 shows the movements in non-defense government purchases.  
Note the values of 2.4% in 1934 and 2.5% in 1936, associated with the New Deal.  Otherwise, 
the only clear pattern is a tendency for non-defense purchases to decline during major wars and 
rise in the aftermaths of these wars.  For example, the non-defense purchases variable ranged 
from -1.0% to -1.2% between 1940 and 1943 and from 0.8% to 1.6% from 1946 to 1949. It is 
hard to be optimistic about using the macroeconomic time series to isolate multipliers for non-
defense government purchases.  The first problem is that the variations in the non-defense 
variable are small compared to those in defense outlays.  More importantly, the changes in non-
defense purchases are likely to be endogenous with respect to GDP.  That is, as with private 
consumption and investment, expansions of the overall economy likely induce governments, 
especially at the state and local level, to spend more on goods and services.  As Ramey (2009a, 
pp. 5-6) observes, outlays by state and local governments have been the dominant part of non-
defense government purchases (since at least 1929).  These expenditures—which relate 
particularly to education, public order, and transportation—are likely to respond to fluctuations 5 
 
in state and local revenue caused by changes in aggregate economic conditions.  Whereas war 
and peace is a plausibly exogenous driver of defense spending, we lack similarly convincing 
exogenous changes in non-defense purchases. 
  A common approach in the existing empirical literature, exemplified by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), is to include government purchases (typically, defense and non-defense 
combined) in a vector-auto-regression (VAR) system and then make identifying assumptions 
concerning exogeneity and timing.  Typically, the government-purchases variable is assumed to 
move first, so that the contemporaneous associations with GDP and other macroeconomic 
aggregates are treated as causal influences from government purchases on the macro variables.  
This approach may be satisfactory for war-driven defense spending, but it seems problematic for 
other forms of government purchases. 
II.  Ramey’s Defense-News Variable 
  The data already discussed refer to actual defense spending (blue graph in Figure 1).  For 
our macroeconomic analysis, we would like to compare current spending with prospective future 
spending and, thereby, assess the perceived degree of permanence of current spending.  For 
example, in the prelude to the U.S. entrance into World War II in 1939-40, people may have 
increasingly believed that future defense outlays would rise because of the heightened chance 
that the United States would enter the war.  In contrast, late in the war, 1944-45, people may 
have increasingly thought that the war would end—successfully for the United States—and, 
hence, that future outlays would fall. 
  Ramey (2009b) quantified these notions about anticipated future defense expenditures 
from 1939 to 2008.  She measured these expectations by using news sources, primarily articles in 
Business Week, to estimate the present discounted value of expected changes in defense spending 6 
 
during quarters of each year.  She considered changed expectations of nominal outlays in most 
cases over the next three-to-five years, and she expressed these changes as present values by 
using U.S. Treasury bond yields.  As an example, she found (Ramey [2009b, p.8]) that, during 
the second quarter of 1940, planned nominal defense spending rose by $3 billion for 1941 and 
around $10 billion for each of 1942, 1943, and 1944.  Using an interest rate of 2.4%, she 
calculated for 1940.2 that the present value of the changed future nominal spending was $31.6 
billion—34% of 1939’s nominal GDP. 
    Ramey (2009a, Table 2) provides quarterly data, and we summed these values for each 
year to construct an annual variable beginning in 1939.  For most of our analysis, the starting 
date of 1939 is satisfactory.  To go back further for parts of the analysis, we assumed, first, that 
the defense-news variable was zero from 1921 to 1938 (a reasonable approximation given the 
absence of U.S. wars and the low and reasonably stable ratio of defense spending to GDP in this 
period).  For World War I (1914-20), we assumed that the overall increment to expected future 
real spending coincided with the total increment to actual real spending, compared to the 
baseline value from 1913 (for which we assumed the defense-news variable equaled zero).  Then 
we assumed that the timing of the news corresponded to the one found by Ramey (2009a, 
Table 2) for World War II:  run-up period for 1914-16 corresponding to 1939-40, war buildup of 
1917-18 corresponding to 1941-43, and wind-down for 1919-20 corresponding to 1944-46.   The 
resulting measure of defense news for World War I is a rough approximation, and it would be 
valuable to extend the Ramey-type analysis formally to this period. 
  Figure 2 shows the estimates for the present value of the expected addition to nominal 
defense spending when expressed as a ratio to the prior year’s nominal GDP.  World War II 
stands out, including the run-up values of 0.40 in 1940, 1.46 in 1941, and 0.75 in 1942, and the 7 
 
wind-down values of -0.07 in 1944 and -0.19 in 1945.  The peak at the start of the Korean War 
(1.16 in 1950) is impressive, signaling that people were concerned about the potential start of 
World War III.  The peak values for World War I are comparatively mild, at 0.20 for 1917-18, 
but this construction involves a lot of assumptions. 
 III.  Average Marginal Income-Tax Rates 
  Marginal income-tax rates have substitution effects that influence decisions on work 
versus consumption, the timing of consumption, investment, capacity utilization, and so on.  
Therefore, we would expect changes in these marginal tax rates to influence GDP and other 
macroeconomic aggregates.  To gauge these effects at the macroeconomic level, we need 
measures of average marginal income-tax rates, AMTR—or other gauges of the distribution of 
marginal tax rates across economic agents. 
  Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986) used the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publication 
Statistics of Income, Individual Income Taxes from various years to construct average marginal 
tax rates from the U.S. federal individual income tax from 1916 to 1983.
3  The Barro-Sahasakul 
series that we use weights each individual marginal income-tax rate by adjusted gross income or 
by analogous income measures available before 1944.  The series takes account of non-filers, 
who were numerous before World War II.  The 1986 study added the marginal income-tax rate 
from the social-security (FICA) tax on wages and self-employment income (starting in 1937 for 
the main social-security program and 1966 for Medicare).  The analysis considered payments by 
employers, employees, and the self-employed and took account of the zero marginal tax rate for 
social security, but not Medicare, above each year’s income ceiling.  However, the earlier 
                                                 
3The current federal individual income-tax system was implemented in 1913, following the ratification of the 16
th 
Amendment, but the first detailed publication from the IRS applies mostly to 1916.  We use IRS information from 
the 1916 book on tax-rate structure and numbers of returns filed in various income categories in 1914-15 to estimate 
average marginal income-tax rates for 1914 and 1915.  For 1913, we approximate based on tax-rate structure and 
total taxes paid. 8 
 
analysis and our present study do not allow for offsetting individual benefits at the margin from 
making social-security “contributions.” 
  We use the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) TAXSIM program, 
administered by Dan Feenberg, to update the Barro-Sahasakul data.  TAXSIM allows for the 
increasing complexity of the federal individual income tax due to the alternative minimum tax, 
the earned-income tax credit (EITC), phase-outs of exemptions and deductions, and so on.
4  
TAXSIM allows for the calculation of average marginal income-tax rates weighted in various 
ways—we focus on the average weighted by a concept of income that is close to labor income:  
wages, self-employment income, partnership income, and S-corporation income.  Although this 
concept differs from the adjusted-gross-income measure used before (particularly by excluding 
most forms of capital income),
5 we find in the overlap from 1966 to 1983 that the Barro-
Sahasakul and NBER TAXSIM series are highly correlated in terms of levels and changes.  For 
the AMTR from the federal individual income tax, the correlations from 1966 to 1983 are 0.99 in 
levels and 0.87 in first differences.  For the social-security tax, the correlations are 0.98 in levels 
and 0.77 in first differences.  In addition, at the start of the overlap period in 1966, the levels of 
Barro-Sahasakul—0.217 for the federal income tax and 0.028 for social security—are not too 
different from those for TAXSIM—0.212 for the federal income tax and 0.022 for social 
security.  Therefore, we are comfortable in using a merged series to cover 1912 to 2006.  The 
                                                 
4The constructed AMTR therefore considers the impact of extra income on the EITC, which has become a major 
transfer program.  However, the construct does not consider effects at the margin on eligibility for other transfer 
programs, such as Medicaid, food stamps, and so on. 
5The Barro-Sahasakul federal marginal tax rate does not consider the deductibility of part of state income taxes.  
However, since the average marginal tax rate from state income taxes up to 1965 does not exceed 0.016, this effect 
would be minor.  In addition, the Barro-Sahasakul series treats the exclusion of employer social-security payments 
from taxable income as a subtraction from the social-security rate, rather than from the marginal rate on the federal 
income tax.  However, this difference would not affect the sum of the marginal tax rates from the federal income tax 
and social security. 9 
 
merged data use the Barro-Sahasakul numbers up to 1965 (supplemented, as indicated in note 3, 
for 1913-15) and the new values from 1966 on. 
  The new construct adds average marginal income-tax rates from state income taxes.
6  
From 1979 to 2006, the samples of income-tax returns provided by the IRS to the NBER include 
state identifiers for returns with AGI under $200,000.  Therefore, with approximations for 
allocating high-income tax returns by state, we were able to use TAXSIM to compute the AMTR 
from state income taxes since 1979.  From 1929 to 1978, we used IncTaxCalc, a program created 
by Jon Bakija, to estimate marginal tax rates from state income taxes.  To make these 
calculations, we combined the information on each state’s tax code (incorporated into 
IncTaxCalc) with estimated numbers on the distribution of income levels by state for each year.  
The latter estimates used BEA data on per capita state personal income.
7  The computations take 
into account that, for people who itemize deductions, an increase in state income taxes reduces 
federal income-tax liabilities.   
  Table 1 and Figure 3 show our time series from 1912 to 2006 for the overall average 
marginal-income tax rate and its three components:  the federal individual income tax, social-
security payroll tax (FICA), and state income taxes.  In 2006, the overall AMTR was 35.3%, 
breaking down into 21.7% for the federal individual income tax, 9.3% for the social-security 
levy (inclusive of employee and employer parts), and 4.3% for state income taxes.
8  For year-to-
                                                 
6The first state income tax was implemented by Wisconsin in 1911, followed by Mississippi in 1912.  A number of 
other states (Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Delaware, Missouri, New York, and North Dakota) implemented an income 
tax soon after the federal individual income tax became effective in 1913. 
7Before 1929, we do not have the BEA data on income by state.  For this period, we estimated the average marginal 
tax rate from state income taxes by a linear interpolation from 0 in 1910 (prior to the implementation of the first 
income tax by Wisconsin in 1911) to 0.0009 in 1929.  Since the average marginal tax rates from state income taxes 
are extremely low before 1929, this approximation would not have much effect on our results. 
8Conceptually, our “marginal rates” correspond to the effect of an additional dollar of income on the amounts paid 
of the three types of taxes.  The calculations consider interactions across the levies; for example, part of state income 
taxes is deductible on federal tax returns, and the employer part of social-security payments does not appear in the 
taxable income of employees. 10 
 
year changes, the movements in the federal individual income tax usually dominate the 
variations in the overall marginal rate.  However, rising social-security tax rates were important 
from 1971 to 1991.  Note that, unlike for government purchases, the marginal income-tax rate for 
each household really is an annual variable; that is, the same rate applies at the margin to income 
accruing at any point within a calendar year.  Thus, for marginal tax-rate variables, it would not 
be meaningful to include variations at a quarterly frequency.
9 
  Given the focus on wage and related forms of income, our constructed average marginal 
income-tax rate applies most clearly to the labor-leisure margin.  However, unmeasured forms of 
marginal tax rates (associated with  corporate income taxes, sales and property taxes, means-
testing for transfer programs, and so on) might move in ways correlated with the measured 
AMTR. 
  Many increases in the AMTR from the federal income tax involve wartime, including 
WWII (a rise in the rate from 3.8% in 1939 to 25.7% in 1945, reflecting particularly the 
extension of the income tax to most households), WWI (an increase from 0.6% in 1914 to 5.4% 
in 1918), the Korean War (going from 17.5% in 1949 to 25.1% in 1952), and the Vietnam War 
(where “surcharges” contributed to the rise in the rate from 21.5% in 1967 to 25.0% in 1969).  
The AMTR tended to fall during war aftermaths, including the declines from 25.7% in 1945 to 
17.5% in 1949, 5.4% in 1918 to 2.8% in 1926, and 25.1% in 1952 to 22.2% in 1954.  No such 
reductions applied after the Vietnam War. 
  A period of rising federal income-tax rates prevailed from 1971 to 1978, with the AMTR 
from the federal income tax increasing from 22.7% to 28.4%.  This increase reflected the shifting 
of households into higher rate brackets due to high inflation in the context of an un-indexed tax 
                                                 
9However, the tax-rate structure need not be set at the beginning of year t.  Moreover, for a given structure, 
information about a household’s marginal income-tax rate for year t arrives gradually during the year as the 
household learns about its income, deductions, etc.   11 
 
system.  Comparatively small tax-rate hikes include the Clinton increase from 21.7% in 1992 to 
23.0% in 1994 (and 24.7% in 2000) and the rise under George H.W. Bush from 21.7% in 1990 to 
21.9% in 1991.  Given the hype about Bush’s violation of his famous pledge, “read my lips, no 
new taxes,” it is surprising that the AMTR rose by only two-tenths of a percentage point in 1991. 
  Major cuts in the AMTR from the federal income tax occurred under Reagan (25.9% in 
1986 to 21.8% in 1988 and 29.4% in 1981 to 25.6% in 1983), George W. Bush (24.7% in 2000 
to 21.1% in 2003), Kennedy-Johnson (24.7% in 1963 to 21.2% in 1965), and Nixon (25.0% in 
1969 to 22.7% in 1971, reflecting the introduction of a maximum marginal rate of 60% on 
earned income). 
  During the Great Depression, the AMTR from federal income taxes fell from 4.1% in 
1928 to 1.7% in 1931, mainly because falling incomes within a given tax structure pushed people 
into lower rate brackets.  Then, particularly because of attempts to balance the federal budget by 
raising taxes under Hoover and Roosevelt, the AMTR rose to 5.2% in 1936. 
 Although  social-security tax rates have less high-frequency variation, they sometimes 
increased sharply.  The AMTR from social security did not change greatly from its original value 
of 0.9% in 1937 until the mid 1950s but then rose to 2.2% in 1966.  The most noteworthy period 
of rising average marginal rates is from 1971—when it was still 2.2%—until 1991, when it 
reached 10.8%.  Subsequently, the AMTR remained reasonably stable, though it fell from 10.2% 
in 2004 to 9.3% in 2006 (due to rising incomes above the social-security ceiling). 
  The marginal rate from state income taxes rose from less than 1% up to 1956 to 4.1% in 
1977 and has since been reasonably stable.  We have concerns about the accuracy of this series, 
particularly before 1979, because of missing information about the distribution of incomes by 
state.  However, the small contribution of state income taxes to the overall AMTR suggests that 12 
 
this measurement error would not matter a lot for our main findings.  The results that we report 
later based on the overall AMTR turn out to be virtually unchanged if we eliminate state income 
taxes from the calculation of the overall marginal rate. 
IV.  Romer-Romer Exogenous Tax-Change Variable 
  Romer and Romer (2008, Table 1) use a narrative approach, based on Congressional 
reports and other sources, to assess all significant federal tax legislation from 1945 to 2007.  
Their main variable (columns 1-4) gauges each tax change by the size and timing of the intended 
effect on federal tax revenue during the first year in which the tax change takes effect.  In 
contrast to the marginal income-tax rates discussed before, their focus is on income effects 
related to the federal government’s tax revenue.  In practice, however, their tax-change variable 
has a high positive correlation with shifts in marginal income-tax rates; that is, a rise in their 
measure of intended federal receipts (expressed as a ratio to the previous year’s GDP) usually 
goes along with an increase in the AMTR.
10  Consequently, the Romer-Romer or AMTR 
variable used alone would pick up a combination of wealth and substitution effects.  However, 
when we include the two tax measures together, we can reasonably view the Romer-Romer 
variable as isolating wealth effects,
11 with the AMTR variable capturing substitution effects.
12 
  Because the Romer-Romer variable is based on planned changes in federal tax revenue, 
assessed during the prior legislative process, this measure avoids the contemporaneous 
endogeneity of tax revenue with respect to GDP.  Thus, the major remaining concern about 
                                                 
10A major counter-example is the Reagan tax cut of 1986, which reduced the average marginal tax rate from the 
federal individual income tax by 4.2 percentage points up to 1988.  Because this program was designed to be 
revenue neutral (by closing “loopholes” along with lowering rates), the Romer-Romer variable shows only  minor 
federal tax changes in 1987 and 1988. 
11Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily imply that these effects are nil.  A high value of the Romer-Romer tax 
variable might signal an increase in the ratio of expected future government spending to GDP, thereby likely 
implying a negative wealth effect. 
12For a given ratio of federal revenue to GDP, an increase in the AMTR might signal that the government had 
shifted toward a less efficient tax-collection system, thereby implying a negative wealth effect. 13 
 
endogeneity involves politics; tax legislation often involves feedback from past or prospective 
economic developments.  To deal with this concern, Romer and Romer divide each tax bill (or 
parts of bills) into four bins, depending on what the narrative evidence reveals about the 
underlying motivation for the tax change.  The four categories are (Romer and Romer [2008, 
abstract]): “… responding to a current or planned change in government spending, offsetting 
other influences on economic activity, reducing an inherited budget deficit, and attempting to 
increase long-run growth.”  They classify the first two bins as endogenous and the second two as 
exogenous, although these designations can be questioned.
13  In any event, we use the Romer-
Romer “exogenous” tax-revenue changes to form an instrument for changes in the AMTR or 
changes in overall federal revenue.  Romer and Romer (2008, Table 1, columns 1-4) provide 
quarterly data, but we use these data only at an annual frequency, thus conforming to our 
treatment for government purchases and average marginal income-tax rates. 
V.  Framework for the Analysis 
  Economists have surely not settled on a definitive theoretical model to assess 
macroeconomic effects of government purchases and taxes.  To form a simple empirical 
framework, we get guidance from the neoclassical setting described in Barro and King (1984).   
Central features of this model are a representative agent with time-separable preferences over 
consumption and leisure, an assumption that consumption and leisure are both normal goods, and 
“market clearing.”  The baseline model also assumes a closed economy, the absence of durable 
goods, and lump-sum taxation.   
                                                 
13The first bin does not actually involve endogeneity of tax changes with respect to GDP but instead reflects concern 
about a correlated, omitted variable—government spending—that may affect GDP.  Empirically, the main cases of 
this type in the Romer-Romer sample associate with variations in defense outlays during and after wars, particularly 
the Korean War. 14 
 
  In the baseline model, pure wealth effects—for example, changes in expected future 
government purchases—have no impact on current GDP.  The reason is that—with time-
separable preferences, an absence of durable goods, and a closed economy—equilibrium choices 
of work effort and consumption are divorced from future events.  This result means that 
temporary and permanent changes in government purchases have the same effect on GDP.  An 
increase in purchases raises GDP because consumption and leisure decline, and the fall in leisure 
corresponds to a rise in labor input.  The spending multiplier is less than one; that is, GDP rises 
by less than the increase in government purchases. 
  With durable goods, a temporary increase in government purchases reduces current 
investment, thereby mitigating the decreases in consumption and leisure.  The spending 
multiplier is still less than one.  Wealth effects now matter in equilibrium:  if the increase in 
purchases is perceived as more permanent, the negative wealth effect is larger in magnitude, and 
the declines in consumption and leisure are greater.  Therefore, the positive effect on GDP from 
a given-size expansion of government purchases is larger the more permanent the change.  
However, an allowance for variable capital utilization can offset this conclusion.  Utilization 
tends to expand more when the increase in purchases is more temporary—because higher 
utilization (which raises output at the expense of higher depreciation of capital) is akin to 
reduced investment. 
  International openness is analogous to variable domestic investment.  A temporary rise in 
government purchases leads to a current-account deficit; that is, net foreign investment moves 
downward along with domestic investment.  The response of the current account mitigates the 
adjustments of consumption, leisure, and domestic investment.  However, the current-account 
movements arise only when government purchases in the home economy change compared to 15 
 
those in foreign economies, a condition that may not hold during a world war.  War may also 
compromise the workings of international asset markets and, thereby, attenuate the responses of 
the current account to changes in defense spending. 
  In the baseline model, variations in lump-sum taxes have no effects in equilibrium.  More 
generally, changes in lump-sum taxes may have wealth effects involving signals about future 
government purchases.  However, if a decrease in lump-sum taxes has a positive wealth effect, it 
reduces current GDP—because consumption and leisure increase, implying a fall in labor input. 
  An increase in today’s marginal tax rate on labor income reduces consumption and raises 
leisure, thereby lowering labor input and GDP.  In the closed-economy setting without durable 
goods, changes in expected future marginal tax rates do not affect current choices in equilibrium.  
With durable goods, a rise in the expected future tax rate on labor income affects current 
allocations in the same way as a negative wealth effect.  That is, consumption and leisure 
decline, and labor input and GDP increase.  Therefore, a temporary rise in the marginal tax rate 
on labor income has more of a negative effect on today’s GDP than an equal-size, but permanent, 
increase in the tax rate. 
  To assess empirically the effects of fiscal variables on GDP, we estimate annual 
equations for the growth rate of per capita real GDP of the form: 
 (1)  (yt – yt-1)/yt-1 = β0 + β1·(gt – gt-1)/yt-1 + β2·(  
        
   )/yt-1 + β3·(τt – τt-1) +  
   other  variables. 
In the equation, yt is per capita real GDP for year t, gt is per capita real government purchases for 
year t,    
 is a measure of expected future real government purchases as gauged in year t, and τt is 
the average marginal income-tax rate for year t.   16 
 
  The form of equation (1) implies that the coefficient β1 is the multiplier for government 
purchases; that is, the effect on year t’s GDP from a one unit increase in purchases, for given 
values of the other variables in the equation.
14  If the variable    
 holds fixed expected future 
government purchases, then β1 represents the contemporaneous effect on GDP from temporary 
purchases.  We are particularly interested in whether β1 is greater than zero, greater than one, and 
larger when the economy has more slack (as implied by some models).  We gauge the last effect 
by adding to the equation an interaction between the variable (gt–gt-1)/yt-1 and the lagged 
unemployment rate, Ut-1, which is a good indicator of the amount of slack in the economy. 
  We emphasize results where gt in equation (1) corresponds to defense spending, and the 
main analysis includes the same variable on the instrument list; that is, we treat variations in 
defense spending as exogenous with respect to contemporaneous GDP.  We also explore an 
alternative specification that treats only war-related movements in defense spending as 
exogenous; that is, the gt variable interacted with a dummy for years related to major war.  Since 
the main movements in defense spending are war related (Figure 1), we end up with similar 
results—especially in samples that cover WWII—as those found when the defense-spending 
variable is itself on the instrument list.  We also consider representing gt by non-defense 
purchases, but this setting leads to problems because of the lack of convincing instruments. 
  In the underlying model, the main effect of government purchases on GDP would be 
contemporaneous, although lagged effects would arise from changes in the capital stock and the 
dynamics of adjustment costs for factor inputs.  In our empirical analysis with annual data, the 
main effect is contemporaneous, but a statistically significant effect from the first lag of defense 
                                                 
14Note that the variable yt is the per capita value of nominal GDP divided by the implicit GDP deflator, Pt 
(determined by the BEA from chain-weighting for 1929-2006).  The variable gt is calculated analogously as the per 
capita value of government purchases (such as defense spending) divided by the same Pt.  Therefore, the units of y 
and g are comparable, and β1 reveals the effect of an extra unit of government purchases on GDP. 17 
 
purchases shows up in samples that include WWII.  To allow for this influence, we include on 
the right-hand side of equation (1) the lagged value, (gt-1-gt-2)/yt-2. 
 We  measure  (  
        
   )/yt-1 in equation (1) by Ramey’s (2009a, Table 2) defense-news 
variable, discussed before and shown in Figure 2.  We anticipate β2>0 because of the wealth 
effects discussed earlier.  More specifically, the Ramey variable focuses on projections of 
defense outlays 3-5 years into the future.  Therefore, if people first become aware in year t of a 
permanent change in military outlay starting in year t, the variable    
 ‐    
   constructed by 
Ramey’s procedure would move by about four times the variable gt-gt-1.  Hence, the multiplier on 
year t’s GDP for a “permanent” change in gt is roughly β1+4·β2.  We do not find a statistically 
significant effect on GDP from the lagged value of the g* variable. 
  Increases in government purchases may be accompanied by increases in marginal 
income-tax rates, which tend to reduce GDP.  According to the tax-smoothing view (Barro 
[1979, 1990]; Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala [2002]), tax rates rise more the longer 
lasting the anticipated increase in government spending.  Thus, on this ground, the effect of 
increased government purchases on GDP tends to be larger the more temporary the change (an 
offset to the predictions from wealth effects).  However, equation (1) holds fixed changes in tax 
rates, represented by τt.  For given tax rates, a rise in government purchases would have a larger 
effect on GDP the more permanent the perceived change, as gauged by the   
  variable. 
  Tax-smoothing considerations imply a Martingale property for marginal tax rates:  future 
changes in tax rates would not be predictable based on information available at date t.  Redlick 
(2009) tests this hypothesis for the data on the overall average marginal income-tax rate shown 
in Table 1.  He finds that the Martingale property is a good first-order approximation but that 
some variables have small, but statistically significant, predictive content for future changes in 18 
 
the AMTR.  However, because most changes in the AMTR are close to permanent, we are 
unable to isolate empirically effects on GDP from temporary changes in tax rates.
15   
   As with government purchases, the main effect of a permanent change in the marginal 
income-tax rate on GDP would be contemporaneous in the underlying model, although lagged 
effects would arise from the dynamics of changes in factor inputs.  Another consideration is that, 
although the marginal tax rate for each individual is an annual variable, changes in tax schedules 
can occur at any point within a year, and these changes are often “retroactive,” in the sense of 
applying without proration to the full year’s income.  For this reason, the adjustment of GDP 
may apply only with a lag to the measured shifts in marginal tax rates.  Therefore, we anticipate 
finding more of a lagged response of GDP to the tax rate, τt, than to government purchases, gt.  
In fact, it turns out empirically in annual data that the main response of the GDP change, yt-yt-1, 
is to the lagged tax-rate change, τt-1-τt-2.  Therefore, our initial empirical analysis focuses on this 
lagged tax-rate change.   
  We make the identifying assumption that changes in average marginal income-tax rates 
lagged one or more years can be satisfactorily treated as pre-determined with respect to GDP.  
We can evaluate this assumption from the tax-smoothing perspective; as already mentioned, this 
approach implies that future changes in tax rates would not be predictable based on information 
available at date t.  If tax smoothing holds as an approximation, then the change in the tax rate 
for year t, τt-τt-1, would reflect mainly information arriving during year t about the future path of 
the ratio of real government expenditure, Gt+T (inclusive here of transfer payments), to real GDP, 
Yt+T.  Information that future government outlays would be higher in relation to GDP would 
                                                 
15Romer and Romer (2008, Table 1, columns 9-12) estimate the implications of tax legislation for the projected 
present value of federal revenue, and these changes can be distinguished from the effects for the initial year 
(columns 1-4).  However, we find empirically (in accord with Romer and Romer [2009, Section VI]) that the 
present-value measure consistently lacks significant incremental explanatory power for GDP. 19 
 
cause an increase in the current tax rate.  For our purposes, the key issue concerns the effects of 
changes in expectations about future growth rates of GDP.  Under tax-smoothing, these changes 
would not impact the current tax rate if the shifts in expected growth rates of GDP go along with 
corresponding changes in expected growth rates of government spending.  Thus, our identifying 
assumption is that any time-varying expectations about growth rates of future GDP do not 
translate substantially into changes in the anticipated future path of G/Y and, therefore, do not 
enter significantly into the determination of tax rates. 
  When we attempt to gauge the contemporaneous effect of the average marginal income-
tax rate, τt, on GDP we encounter serious identification problems:  changes in τt are surely 
endogenous with respect to contemporaneous GDP.  We take two approaches to constructing 
instruments to isolate the contemporaneous effect of tax-rate changes on GDP.  First, we 
computed the average marginal income-tax rate that would apply in year t based on incomes 
from year t-1.  This construct eliminates the channel whereby higher income shifts people into 
higher tax-rate brackets for a given tax law.  However, this approach leaves the likely 
endogeneity associated with legislative decisions about tax rates.  To address the endogeneity of 
legislation, we use as an instrument the “exogenous” part of the Romer and Romer (2008, 
Table 1, columns 1-4) federal-tax-change series.   
  In Romer and Romer (2009), the counterpart of τt in equation (1) is the exogenous part of 
tax revenue collected as a share of GDP.  Thus, as noted before, their approach focuses on 
income effects, rather than substitution effects.  In our underlying model, an increase in tax 
revenue could have a negative wealth effect if it signals a rise in expected future government 
purchases—not fully held constant by the variable    
  in equation (1).  However, for given tax 
rates, the negative wealth effect from higher tax revenue would tend to raise labor input and, 20 
 
therefore, GDP.  In other words, we predict β3>0 in equation (1) for this case, the opposite of the 
predicted effect for marginal income-tax rates. 
  The other variables in equation (1) include indicators of the lagged state of the business 
cycle.  This inclusion is important because, otherwise, the fiscal variables might reflect the 
dynamics of the business cycle.  In the main analysis, we include the first lag of the 
unemployment rate, Ut-1.  Given a tendency for the economy to recover from recessions, we 
expect a positive coefficient on Ut-1.  With the inclusion of this lagged business-cycle variable, 
the estimated form of equation (1) does not reveal significant serial correlation in the residuals.  
We also considered as business-cycle indicators the first lag of the dependent variable and the 
deviation of the previous year’s log of per capita real GDP from its “trend.”  However, these 
alternative variables turn out not to be statistically significant once Ut-1 is included. 
  Many additional variables could affect GDP in equation (1).  However, as Romer and 
Romer (2009) have argued, omitted variables that are orthogonal to the fiscal variables (once 
lagged business-cycle indicators are included) would not bias the estimated effects of the fiscal 
variables.  The main effect that seemed important to consider—particularly for samples that 
include the Great Depression of 1929-33—is an indicator of monetary/credit conditions.  In a 
recent study, Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) argue that default spreads for corporate 
bonds compared to similar maturity U.S. Treasury bonds have substantial predictive power for 
macroeconomic variables for 1990-2008.  They also discuss the broader literature on the 
predictive power of default spreads, parts of which focus on the Great Depression (see Stock and 
Watson [2003]). 
  In applying previous results on default spreads to our context, we have to rely on the 
available long-term data on the gap between the yield to maturity on long-maturity Baa-rated 21 
 
corporate bonds and that on long-maturity U.S. government bonds.  We think that this yield 
spread captures distortions in credit markets, and the square of the spread (analogous to 
conventional distortion measures for tax rates) works in a reasonably stable way in the 
explanation of GDP growth in equation (1).  Since the contemporaneous spread would be 
endogenous with respect to GDP, we instrument with the first lag of the spread variable.
16  That 
is, given the lagged business-cycle indicator already included, we treat the lagged yield spread as 
pre-determined with respect to GDP.  Although the inclusion of this credit variable likely 
improves the precision of our estimates of fiscal effects, we get similar results if the credit 
variable is omitted. 
  An additional issue for estimating equation (1) is measurement error in the right-hand-
side variables, a particular concern because government purchases—which appear on the right-
hand side of the equation—are also a component of GDP on the left-hand side.  Consider a 
simplified version of equation (1): 
 ( 2 )     y t = β0 + β1·gt + error term. 
GDP equals government purchases plus the other parts of GDP (consumer spending, gross 
private domestic investment, net exports).  If we label these other parts as xt, we have: 
 ( 3 )     y t = gt + xt. 
Consider estimating the equation: 
 ( 4 )     x t = α0 + α1·gt + error term, 
where α1, if negative, gauges the crowding-out effect of gt on other parts of GDP.  Measurement 
error in gt tends to bias standard estimates of α1 toward zero.  However, we also have from 
comparing equation (2) with a combination of equations (3) and (4) that the estimate of β1 has to 
                                                 
16Since the yield spread has strong persistence, the lagged value has high explanatory power.  For example, in a 
first-stage regression for the square of the yield spread from 1917 to 2006, the t-statistic on the lagged variable 
is 9.3. 22 
 
coincide with 1 + estimate of α1.  Therefore, a bias in the estimate of α1 toward zero corresponds 
to a bias in the estimate of β1 toward one.  Thus, if α1<0, spending multipliers tend to be over-
estimated. 
VI.  Empirical Results 
  Table 2 shows regressions with annual data of the form of equation (1).  The samples all 
end in 2006.  The starting year is 1950 (including the Korean War), 1939 (including WWII), 
1930 (including the Great Depression), or 1917 (including WWI and the 1921 contraction).  The 
last column, starting in 1954, excludes all of the main variations in defense spending. 
  A.  Defense-Spending Multipliers 
  Consider the estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous defense-spending variable, 
Δg: defense.  With the defense-news variable held fixed, the coefficient on Δg: defense gives the 
contemporaneous multiplier for purely temporary spending.  For all samples that start in 1950 or 
earlier, the estimated coefficient of Δg: defense in Table 2 is significantly greater than zero at the 
5% level, with p values less than 0.01 for the samples that include WWII.
17  For the 1950 
sample, the estimated coefficient, 0.68 (s.e.=0.27), is insignificantly different from one 
(p-value=0.24).  For samples that start in 1939 or earlier, and thereby include WWII, the 
estimated coefficient is much more precisely determined.  These estimates are significantly less 
than one with p-values less than 0.01.  In columns 2-4 of the table, the estimated coefficient is 
between 0.44 and 0.47, with standard errors between 0.06 and 0.08.
18 
                                                 
17See Barro (1984, pp. 312-315) for an earlier analysis of the effects of wartime spending on output.  Hall (2010, 
Table 1) also presents estimates of defense-spending multipliers associated with wars. 
18A sample starting in 1914 gives results similar to those for the 1917 sample shown in Table 2, column 5.  Given 
the likely large measurement error in the variable Δg*: defense news for 1914-16, we do not highlight the results for 
the 1914 sample. 23 
 
  The estimated coefficient on the lagged change in defense purchases, Δg: defense (-1), is 
close to zero for the 1950 sample but around 0.2 for samples that include WWII.  For the 1939 
sample, the estimate is 0.20 (s.e.=0.06), which differs significantly from zero with a p-value less 
than 0.01.  In this case, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0.44 in the 
current year and 0.64 (0.44 + 0.20) in the subsequent year.  The last estimate is still significantly 
less than one (with a p-value of 0.000). 
  The estimated coefficient of the defense-news variable, Δg*: defense news, is positive in 
all samples that start in 1950 or earlier—and significantly different from zero with a p-value less 
than 0.05 for the longer samples.
19  As discussed before, this variable gives the effect on year t’s 
GDP from a change in year t in the expected present value of future defense spending.  The 
positive coefficient accords with the model’s prediction, whereby a negative wealth effect from 
greater prospective defense spending leads to more work effort and, hence, higher GDP.  As also 
discussed before, for a permanent increase in defense spending that starts and becomes 
recognized in year t, the full multiplier on current GDP equals the coefficient of Δg: defense plus 
roughly four times the coefficient of Δg*: defense news (because Ramey’s defense-news 
variable typically applies three-to-five years into the future).  For example, for the 1939 sample 
in column 2 of Table 2, the point estimate of this full multiplier is about 0.44 + 4*0.039 = 0.60.  
To put it another way, 4*0.039=0.16 gives the excess of the contemporaneous multiplier for 
permanent spending over that for temporary spending (0.44).  The estimated full multiplier, 0.60, 
is still significantly less than one (with a p-value of 0.000).  The estimated multiplier over two 
years for a permanent change in defense spending is 0.60 plus 0.20 (the estimated coefficient on 
Δg: defense (-1) in column 2), or around 0.80.  This estimate is still significantly less than one 
(with a p-value of 0.004). 
                                                 
19 If we add the lagged value of Δg*: defense news, the estimated coefficient is close to zero. 24 
 
  As discussed before, each regression includes the lagged unemployment rate, Ut-1, to pick 
up business-cycle dynamics.  The estimated coefficients on Ut-1 in Table 2 are significantly 
positive with p-values less than 0.01 for each sample, indicating a tendency for the economy to 
recover by growing faster when the lagged unemployment rate is higher.  We also tried as 
business-cycle variables the lag of the dependent variable and the lag of the deviation of the log 
of per capita GDP from its trend (gauged by one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filters).  In all cases, the 
estimated coefficients of these alternative variables differed insignificantly from zero, whereas 
the estimated coefficient on the lagged unemployment rate remained significantly positive. 
  We added an interaction term, (Δg: defense)*Ut-1, to assess whether the contemporaneous 
defense-spending multiplier depends on the amount of slack in the economy, gauged by the 
lagged unemployment rate.  The variable Ut-1 in this interaction term enters as a deviation from 
the median unemployment rate of 0.0557 (calculated from 1914 to 2006).  Therefore, in this 
specification, the coefficient on the variable Δg: defense reveals the multiplier for temporary 
defense spending when the lagged unemployment rate is at the sample median, and the 
interaction term indicates how this multiplier varies as Ut-1 deviates from its median.   
  The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable, (Δg: defense)*Ut-1, differs 
insignificantly from zero for each sample considered in Table 2.  For example, if we add this 
variable to the 1939 regression (column 2), the estimated coefficient is 0.6 (s.e.=2.6), and the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors for the other variables remain similar to those shown 
in the table.  In previous research, which did not consider the defense-news variable, the 
multiplier appeared to rise with the unemployment rate.  For the 1939 sample (column 2), if we 
delete the defense-news variable and add the interaction term, the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction variable is 4.8 (2.1).  This coefficient would imply that a rise in the unemployment 25 
 
rate by two percentages points increases the contemporaneous multiplier by about 0.1.  The 
reason that the inclusion of the defense-news variable eliminates this effect is that the interaction 
variable is particularly large in the run-up to World War II, reflecting the unemployment rate of 
9.4% in 1940.  However, the defense-news variable is also large at this time—once the effect 
from this variable is taken into account, the interaction term is no longer important.  Further, 
when Δg*: defense news and the interaction term are included together for the 1939 sample, the 
estimated coefficient of the news variable is significantly positive, 0.037 (s.e.=0.014), whereas 
that for the interaction is insignificantly different from zero, 0.6 (2.6). 
  As already noted, the wartime experiences include substantially positive and negative 
values for Δg: defense (and also for Δg*: defense news).  The estimates shown in Table 2 assume 
that the effects on GDP are the same for increases and decreases in spending, notably, for war 
buildups and demobilizations.  Tests of this hypothesis are accepted at high p-values.  For 
example, for the 1939 sample (Table 2, column 2), the estimated coefficients are 0.50 (s.e.=0.09) 
for positive values of Δg: defense and 0.39 (0.08) for negative values, with a p-value of 0.40 
applying to a test of equal coefficients.  We can also allow for separate coefficients for positive 
and negative values of the lagged defense-spending variable.  In this case, for contemporaneous 
Δg: defense, we get 0.40 (0.11) for positive values and 0.41 (0.08) for negative values, whereas 
for lagged Δg: defense, we get 0.33 (0.10) for positive values and 0.12 (0.08) for negative values.  
The p-value for a test that the coefficients of the positive and negative values are the same in 
both pairs is 0.18.  We also accept the hypothesis (with a p-value of 0.20) when broadened to 
include positive versus negative values of Δg*: defense news.  Thus, the evidence accords with 
the condition that spending multipliers are the same for increases and decreases in defense 
spending. 26 
 
  The estimates in Table 2 treat all variations in defense spending as exogenous.  However, 
the case for exogeneity with respect to GDP is most compelling for variations in defense 
spending associated with buildups and wind-downs of major wars.  In practice, because the 
wartime observations capture the principal fluctuations in defense spending, the results change 
little if we modify the instrument list to exclude Δg: defense but to include this variable 
interacted with “war years.”
20  For the 1950 sample, the estimated coefficient on Δg: defense 
becomes 0.86 (s.e.=0.30), somewhat higher than the one in Table 2, column 1; that on Δg: 
defense (-1) becomes -0.05 (0.28); and that on Δg*: defense news is still 0.026 (0.016).  For 
samples that start in 1939 or earlier, the change in the instrument list has a negligible impact.
21  
For example, for the 1939 sample in column 2, the estimated coefficient on Δg: defense becomes 
0.46 (s.e.=0.06), that on Δg: defense (-1) becomes 0.19 (0.06), and that on Δg*: defense news 
becomes 0.038 (0.011). 
  For a sample that starts after the Korean War, 1954-2006 in column 5 of Table 2, the 
point estimates of the coefficients are 0.98 (s.e.=0.65) on Δg: defense and -0.54 (0.56) on Δg: 
defense (-1).  The high standard errors imply that neither estimated coefficient, nor the two 
jointly, differ significantly from zero.  The sum of the two coefficients also differs insignificantly 
from one.  For the variable Δg*: defense news, the result is -0.12 (0.11); that is, the large 
standard error makes it impossible to draw meaningful inferences.  The estimated coefficients of 
the other variables are close to those for the 1950 sample in column 1.  The conclusion is that, in 
                                                 
20We treated as major wars WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, including a year of war aftermath 
for each case.  The specific sample is 1914-20, 1939-46, 1950-54, and 1966-71.  We treated WWI as ending in 1919 
and thereby included 1920 as the year of war aftermath, but the results change little if we treat the war as ending in 
1918, so that 1919 is the year of war aftermath.  
21This result is not surprising because, in a first-stage regression for 1939-2006 of Δg: defense on the “exogenous” 
variables, the estimated coefficient on Δg: defense interacted with war years is 0.945 (s.e.=0.012); that is, the 
t-statistic is 77. 27 
 
the post-1954 sample, there is insufficient variation in defense outlays to get an accurate reading 
on defense-spending multipliers. 
  B.  Marginal Income-Tax Rates 
  The equations in Table 2 include the lagged change in the average marginal income-tax 
rate, Δτ(-1).  For the sample that starts in 1950 in column 1, the estimated coefficient is -0.54 
(s.e.=0.21), which is significantly negative with a p-value less than 0.01.  Thus, the estimate is 
that a cut in the AMTR by 1 percentage point raises next year’s per capita GDP by around 0.5%. 
  We can compare our estimated effect of tax-rate changes on GDP to microeconomic 
estimates of labor-supply elasticities, as summarized by Chetty (2009, Table 1).  His results 
apply to elasticities of hours or taxable income with respect to 1-τ, where τ is the marginal 
income-tax rate.  For 17 studies (excluding those based on macroeconomic data), the mean of the 
estimated elasticities, η, is 0.33.  The implied effect of a change in τ on the log of hours or 
taxable income entails multiplying η by –1/(1-τ).  Our AMTR has a mean of 0.33 from 1950 to 
2006.  If we evaluate the microeconomic estimates at the point where τ=0.33, the effect from a 
change in τ on the log of hours or taxable income is –η/(1-τ) = -0.33·(1.49) = -0.49.  If GDP 
moves in the same proportion as hours and taxable income, this number should correspond to the 
estimated coefficient on Δτ(-1) in Table 2.  Since that point estimate is -0.54, there does turn out 
to be a close correspondence.  That is, our macroeconomic estimate of the response of GDP to a 
change in the AMTR accords with typical microeconomic estimates of labor-supply elasticities.   
  The estimated coefficient of -0.54 on Δτ(-1) in Table 2, column 1, does not correspond to 
a usual tax multiplier for GDP.  Our results connect the change in GDP to a shift in the average 
marginal income-tax rate, not to variations in tax revenue, per se.  As an example, for a revenue-
neutral change in the tax-rate structure, such as the plan for the 1986 tax reform, the conventional 28 
 
tax multiplier would be minus infinity.  However, the typical pattern (reasonable from the 
perspective of optimal taxation) is that increases in the ratio of tax revenue to GDP accompany 
increases in the AMTR, and vice versa.  We can, therefore, compute a tax multiplier that gives 
the ratio of the change in GDP to the change in tax revenue when we consider the typical relation 
of tax revenue to the AMTR. 
  Let T be the average tax rate, gauged by the ratio of federal revenue to GDP, so that real 
revenue is T·GDP.  The change in revenue, when expressed as a ratio to GDP, is: 
 (5)   Δ(revenue)/GDP = T·ΔGDP/GDP + ΔT. 
The estimates in Table 2, column 1, suggest ΔGDP/GDP = -0.54·Δτ, where τ is the average 
marginal income-tax rate (applying here to federal taxes). 
  We now have to connect the change in the average tax rate, ΔT, to Δτ.  From 1950 to 
2006, the average of T (nominal federal revenue divided by nominal GDP) is 0.182.  The 
average for τ (based only on the federal individual income tax plus social security) is 0.297.  We 
therefore take as a typical relation that an increase in τ by one percentage point associates with 
an increase in T by 0.61 of a percentage point (the ratio of 0.182 to 0.297).  If we substitute this 
result and the previous one for ΔGDP/GDP into equation (5), we get 
 (6)     Δ(revenue)/GDP = (–0.54·T + 0.61)·Δτ. 
If we evaluate equation (6) at the sample average for T of 0.182, we get    
 (7)   Δ(revenue)/GDP = 0.51·Δτ. 
Finally, if we use equation (7), we get that the “tax multiplier” is 
 (8)   ΔGDP/Δ(revenue) = [ΔGDP/GDP]/[Δ(revenue)/GDP] 
   =  -0.54·Δτ/0.51·Δτ = -1.06. 
Thus, the empirical results correspond to a conventional tax multiplier of around -1.1. 29 
 
  We found in Table 2, for given average marginal income-tax rates, that the estimated 
defense-spending multipliers ranged from 0.4 to 0.8, depending on whether we considered 
effects contemporaneously or over two years and whether the change in spending was temporary 
or permanent.  These spending multipliers pertain most clearly to variations in defense spending 
that are deficit financed.  If, instead, higher spending goes along with higher government revenue 
and correspondingly higher marginal tax rates, we have to factor in the negative tax multiplier, 
estimated to be around -1.1.  Since the tax multiplier is larger in magnitude than the spending 
multipliers,
22 our estimates imply that GDP declines in response to higher defense spending and 
correspondingly higher tax revenue.  In other words, the estimated balanced-budget multiplier is 
negative—in the range of -0.3 to -0.7. 
  Samples that start earlier than 1950 show less of an impact from Δτ(-1) on GDP growth; 
for example, for the sample that starts in 1930, in Table 2, column 3, the estimated coefficient is 
-0.26 (s.e.=0.22).  One issue is that, during the world wars, GDP may be less responsive than 
usual to increases in marginal income-tax rates because of extensive governmental controls over 
the allocation of resources (as discussed later).  However, the most influential event that weakens 
the estimated effect is the mismatch between the large tax-rate cut of 1948 (where the AMTR fell 
from 0.24 in 1947 to 0.19 in 1948) and the 1949 recession (where per capita real GDP fell by 
2.3% for 1948-49).  If this one observation is omitted from the 1930 sample, the estimated 
coefficient on Δτ(-1) become -0.52 (s.e.=0.23), essentially the same as the one for the 1950 
sample (column 1). 
 
                                                 
22This result accords with Alesina and Ardagna (2010), who study 107 cases of large fiscal contraction and 91 of 
large fiscal stimulus for 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2007.  They find that fiscal stimuli are more likely to 
increase economic growth when the package is concentrated more on tax cuts than on spending increases.  Similarly, 
they find for fiscal contractions that recessions are more likely to materialize when the package focuses on tax 
increases rather than spending reductions. 30 
 
  C.  The Yield Spread 
  Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficient on the yield-spread variable is significantly 
negative at the 5% level for each sample, except for the one that starts in 1939 (for which the 
p-value in column 2 is 0.09).  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is similar across 
samples, except for ones that include the Great Depression.  The inclusion of the Depression 
raises the magnitude of the estimated coefficient (to fit the low growth rates of 1930-33).  For 
example, for the 1930 sample (column 3), if we allow for two separate coefficients on the yield-
spread variable, the estimated coefficients are -111.9 (s.e.=14.7) for 1930-38 and -33.8 (28.6) for 
1939-2006.  (This regression includes separate intercepts up to and after 1938.)  The two 
estimated coefficients on the yield-spread variable differ significantly with a p-value of 0.021. 
  An important result is that the estimated coefficients on the defense-spending and tax-rate 
variables do not change a lot if the equations exclude the yield-spread variable.  For example, for 
the 1939 sample (Table 2, column 2), the estimated coefficients become 0.44 (s.e.=0.07) on Δg: 
defense, 0.21 (0.07) on Δg: defense (-1), 0.045 (0.012) on Δg*: defense news, and -0.19 (0.18) 
on Δτ(-1).  Similar results apply to the 1930 and 1917 samples.  For the 1950 sample (column 1), 
the deletion of the yield-spread variable raises the magnitudes of the estimated fiscal effects:  the 
estimated coefficients become 0.80 (0.30) on Δg: defense, 0.08 (0.32) on Δg: defense (-1), 0.034 
(0.017) on Δg*: defense news, and -0.63 (0.23) on Δτ(-1). 
  Since we think that holding fixed a measure of credit conditions sharpens the estimates 
for the fiscal variables, we focus on the results in Table 2.  However, the robustness of the main 




  D.  More Results on Government Purchases 
  The results in Table 2 seem to provide reliable estimates of defense-spending multipliers, 
particularly for samples that include WWII.  The estimated multipliers range from 0.4 to 0.8, 
depending on whether we consider responses over one or two years and on whether the change in 
spending is temporary or permanent.  However, to evaluate typical fiscal-stimulus packages, we 
are more interested in multipliers associated with non-defense purchases.  The problem, already 
mentioned, is that this multiplier is hard to estimate because observed movements in non-defense 
purchases are likely to be endogenous with respect to GDP.  Given this problem, it is important 
to assess whether the defense-spending multipliers provide upper or lower bounds for the non-
defense multiplier. 
  Consider, from a theoretical standpoint, how the multiplier for non-defense purchases 
relates to that for defense spending.  One point is that movements in defense spending, driven 
substantially by war and peace, tend to be more temporary than those in non-defense purchases.  
For given tax rates, the multiplier tends to be larger when the change in government purchases is 
more permanent.  Thus, on this ground, the multiplier for non-defense purchases likely exceeds 
that for temporary defense spending.  However, this argument would not apply to the temporary 
increases in government spending that are at least promised in typical “stimulus packages.” 
  As already mentioned, wars typically feature command-and-control techniques, including 
rationing private expenditure on goods and services, drafting people to work in the military, and 
forcing companies to produce tanks rather than cars (all without reliance on explicit prices).  
Rationing tends to hold down private demand for goods and services, thereby making the 
spending multiplier smaller than otherwise.  However, mandated increases of production and 
labor input tend to raise the aggregate supply of goods and services, thereby increasing the 32 
 
spending multiplier.  An offsetting force is that government-mandated output may be under-
valued in the computation of GDP—if tanks carry unrealistically low “prices” and if draftee 
wages (including provision of food, housing, etc.) fall short of private-sector wages.  An 
additional consideration, stressed by Mulligan (1998), is that, during a popular war such as 
WWII, patriotism likely shifts labor supply outward.
23  This boost to the aggregate supply of 
goods and services tends to make the wartime multiplier comparatively large. 
   Our conjecture is that, because of command-and-control and patriotism considerations, 
defense-spending multipliers tend to exceed the non-defense multiplier.  In this case, the 
defense-spending multipliers—for which we have good estimates—would provide upper bounds 
for the non-defense multiplier.  However, since the comparison between the multipliers is 
generally ambiguous on theoretical grounds, it would obviously be desirable to have direct, 
reliable estimates of the non-defense multiplier. 
  Table 3 shows results when a non-defense purchases variable—constructed analogously 
to the defense-spending variable—is added to the regressions in Table 2.  (We lack a Ramey-
type measure of news on non-defense purchases and, therefore, do not include such a variable.)  
Crucially, the instrument lists for columns 1-4 of Table 3 include the non-defense purchases 
variable.  The estimated multiplier for the 1950 sample (column 1) is large and significantly 
different from zero—the estimated coefficient is 2.65 (s.e.=0.93).
24  However, the estimated 
coefficients are insignificantly different from zero for the other samples, which start in 1939, 
1930, or 1917.  A reasonable interpretation is that the estimated coefficients on the non-defense 
                                                 
23An offsetting, negative force on work effort arises from threats to future property rights stemming from the 
chances of losing a war. 
24If we add the lag of the change in non-defense purchases, we get estimated coefficients of 1.84 (s.e.=1.02) on the 
contemporaneous variable and 1.72 (1.01) on the lag.  The two coefficients are jointly statistically significantly 
different from zero with a p-value of 0.003. 33 
 
purchases variable pick up primarily reverse causation from GDP to government spending but 
that the nature of this reverse linkage varies over time. 
   To illustrate the potential for spuriously high estimated multipliers due to endogeneity, in 
Table 3, columns 5 and 6, we replaced the non-defense purchases variable by analogously 
constructed variables based on sales of two large U.S. corporations with long histories—General 
Motors and General Electric.  These sales variables appear on the instrument list in each case.  In 
column 5, the estimated “multiplier” for GM sales for the 1950 sample is 3.7 (s.e.=0.9).  That is, 
this “multiplier” exceeds three.  For GE sales—which are less volatile than GM’s but also more 
correlated with GDP—the result is even more extreme, 17.6 (4.7).  Moreover, unlike for non-
defense purchases, the estimated GM and GE coefficients are reasonably stable over the various 
samples.  Clearly, the GM and GE estimates reflect mainly reverse causation from GDP to sales 
of individual companies.  We think that a similar perspective applies to the apparent multiplier 
above two estimated for non-defense government purchases for the 1950 sample in column 1. 
  The problem is that, lacking good instruments, we cannot estimate multipliers 
satisfactorily for non-defense government purchases.  The vector-autoregression (VAR) 
literature makes identifying assumptions based typically on changes in government purchases 
being pre-determined within a quarter (see, for example, Blanchard and Perotti [2002]).  This 
procedure, which has been criticized by Ramey (2009a), corresponds in annual data to the kinds 
of estimates for non-defense purchases shown in columns 1-4 of Table 3.  We think these results 
are not meaningful.  Probably a more productive avenue is a search for satisfactory instruments 
for changes in non-defense government purchases for the United States or other countries.  
Political variables related to spending programs may provide satisfactory instruments.  
Applications of this approach to cross-sectional allocations of U.S. New Deal spending include 34 
 
Wright (1974) and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005).  An application to Swedish 
municipalities is Johansson (2003). 
   E.  Components of GDP 
  We now assess how changes in defense spending affect components of GDP.  Recall first 
the predictions from the theoretical framework described earlier.  We consider the breakdown for 
GDP net of defense spending into consumption, domestic investment, non-defense government 
purchases, and net exports.  In applications, we identify consumption with consumer expenditure 
on non-durables and services, and we view consumer spending on durables as a form of 
investment.   
  Table 4 shows the predicted signs for the responses of each component of GDP to 
changes in current defense spending, g, and news about future defense spending, g*.  GDP rises 
in each case, corresponding to increases in labor input (and, for g, to increased capital 
utilization).  Consumption falls in each case.  The declines in non-defense government purchases 
follow if we view these purchases as primarily forms of consumption.  Differing responses show 
up for domestic investment, which declines in response to higher current spending, g (for given 
g*), but rises in response to news that future spending will be higher, g* (for given g).  The 
change in net exports, corresponding to the change in net foreign investment, follows the same 
pattern as that for domestic investment.  However, the effects on net exports arise only when the 
changes in g and g* in the home economy are relative to those in foreign economies. 
  Table 5 shows regressions when the dependent variables are changes in components of 
GDP.   For example, for consumer expenditure on non-durables and services, the dependent 
variable is the difference between this year’s per capita real expenditure (nominal spending 
divided by the GDP deflator) and the previous year’s per capita real expenditure, all divided by 35 
 
the prior year’s per capita real GDP.  The same approach applies to consumer expenditure on 
durables, gross private domestic investment, non-defense government purchases, and net exports.  
Note that this method relates spending on the various parts of GDP to defense spending and the 
other right-hand-side variables considered in Table 2 but does not allow for effects from 
changing relative prices, for example, for consumption goods versus investment goods.  In this 
approach, the effects found for overall GDP in Table 2 correspond to the sum of the effects for 
the components of GDP in Table 5.  For example, the defense-spending multiplier estimated in 
Table 2 equals one plus the sum of the estimated effects on the five components of GDP in 
Table 5.  For the other right-hand-side variables, the estimated effect in Table 2 equals the sum 
of the estimated effects in Table 5. 
  The data for the components of GDP in Table 5 come from BEA information available 
annually since 1929.  Therefore, the samples considered do not go back before 1930.  (The 1917 
sample in Table 2 used non-BEA data before 1929 for GDP and government purchases.) 
  Consider the 1939 sample, for which the point estimates for the effects on GDP from the 
contemporaneous defense-spending variables in Table 2, column 2, were 0.44 for Δg: defense 
and 0.039 for Δg*: defense news.  Correspondingly, the effects on the components of GDP in 
Table 5 add to -0.56 for Δg: defense (contemporaneous crowding out) and 0.039 for Δg*: 
defense news.  The most striking correspondence between the empirical findings and the theory 
(Table 4) is for the impact of the current defense-spending variables on investment.  The 
estimated coefficients for Δg: defense for the 1939 sample in Table 5 are significantly negative:  
-0.115 (s.e.=0.016) for durable consumption purchases and -0.356 (0.045) for gross private 
domestic investment, whereas those for Δg*: defense news are significantly positive:  0.012 
(0.003) and 0.034 (0.008), respectively.  The theory predicted negative effects on consumption, 36 
 
but the estimated effects from the current defense-spending variables on non-durable consumer 
spending differ insignificantly from zero.  For non-defense government purchases, the estimated 
effect from Δg: defense also differs insignificantly from zero, but that from Δg*: defense news is 
significantly negative, -0.008 (0.002), as predicted.  Finally, for net exports, the estimated effect 
from Δg: defense is significantly negative, -0.07 (0.02), as expected, but that from Δg*: defense 
news differs insignificantly from zero.  The last effect may arise because changes during the 
major wars in U.S. g* tend to go along with corresponding changes in many countries’ g*. 
  The results for Δg: defense and Δg*: defense news in Table 5 for the other samples are 
similar, except that the standard errors are higher for the 1950 sample.  One difference is that the 
effect of Δg*: defense news on net exports in the 1950 sample is significantly negative, -0.014 
(s.e.=0.004). 
  The negative effect from the average marginal income-tax rate on GDP shows up most 
clearly in Table 2 for the 1950 sample, with an estimated coefficient of -0.54 (s.e.=0.21).  
Table 5 shows that this response shows up across the board for the categories of consumer 
spending and investment:  -0.18 (0.07) for non-durable consumer expenditure, -0.14 (0.06) for 
durable consumer expenditure, and -0.30 (0.14) for gross private domestic investment. 
  For the yield- spread variable, Table 2 shows negative effects on GDP for all samples, 
but the response is larger in size and more statistically significant in the 1930 sample.  In 
Table 5, the negative effects for the 1930 sample are spread across non-durable consumer 
spending, -42.3 (s.e.=5.9), durable consumer spending, -12.9 (2.7), and gross private domestic 




  F.  Total Government Purchases 
  If an expansion of defense spending crowds out non-defense purchases, the rise in overall 
government purchases would fall short of the increase in defense spending.  Therefore, a 
multiplier calculated from defense spending alone may understate the multiplier computed for 
overall government purchases.  If we assume that the non-defense and defense multipliers are the 
same,
25 we can estimate the multiplier for overall purchases by replacing the variable 
Δg: defense in Table 2 with the corresponding measure, Δg: total government purchases, 
computed from overall government purchases.  In these revised equations, shown in Table 6, the 
instrument list still includes the variable Δg: defense, not Δg: total government purchases.  
However, the lagged value of Δg: total government purchases is on the instrument list. 
  If we compare the results from Table 6 with those from Table 2, we find little changes in 
the estimated effects when comparing the coefficients of Δg: total government purchases 
(contemporaneous and lagged) with those for Δg: defense.  The reason is that, in Table 5, the 
crowding-out effects from Δg: defense (contemporaneous and lagged) on non-defense 
government purchases are small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.  The 
significant crowding-out applies to the variable Δg*: defense news.  Because of this channel, the 
estimated effects from Δg*: defense news on GDP are somewhat higher—by around 0.005 in the 
longer samples—in Table 6 than in Table 2.  The bottom line is that the shift to total government 
purchases produces only minor changes in the estimated spending multipliers. 
   G.  More Results on Taxes 
  Thus far, the findings on taxes involve changes in average marginal income-tax rates, 
which have straightforward substitution effects.  However, tax changes may also matter through 
                                                 
25We cannot test this proposition without satisfactory instruments related to non-defense purchases.  38 
 
wealth effects, the channel stressed by Romer and Romer (2009).  These effects would involve 
changes in tax revenue, rather than marginal tax rates. 
  Empirically, movements in the average marginal income-tax rate, AMTR, are 
substantially positively correlated with changes in tax revenue.  From 1950 to 2006, the 
correlation of the change in the federal part of our AMTR is 0.62 with the change in per capita 
real federal revenue expressed as a ratio to the prior year’s per capita real GDP, 0.74 with the 
variable that Romer and Romer (2008) constructed to gauge incremental federal tax revenue 
(expressed as a ratio to lagged GDP), and 0.46 with the part of their incremental federal revenue 
that Romer and Romer labeled as exogenous (expressed relative to lagged GDP).  Given these 
correlations, the AMTR used in Table 2 could be picking up a combination of substitution and 
wealth effects in the determination of GDP.  We try now to sort out these effects. 
  Table 7 presents further results on taxes for the 1950-2006 sample.  Column 1 is the same 
as column 1 of Table 2, except for a minor difference in the instrument list.  As before, the 
estimated coefficient on the first lag of the change in the AMTR is significantly negative, -0.53 
(s.e.=0.21).
26   If we add an additional lag of the change in the AMTR, the estimated coefficient 
on the first lag changes little, and that on the second lag is statistically insignificantly different 
from zero, -0.22 (0.22). 
  Column 2 of Table 7 replaces the AMTR variable by the first lag of the variable 
emphasized by Romer and Romer (2009)—the exogenous part of intended changes in federal tax 
revenue expressed as a ratio to lagged GDP.  This variable appears also on the instrument lists 
                                                 
26Our focus is on the overall marginal income-tax rate; that is, we implicitly have the same coefficients for changes 
in federal and state income-tax rates as for changes in social-security tax rates.  If we separate the two income-tax 
rates from the social-security rate, we surprisingly get larger size coefficients for social security.  The hypothesis of 
equal magnitude coefficients for the two variables is rejected with a p-value of 0.009.  We have no good explanation 
for this result.  However, a key part of the data pattern is that the increases in the AMTR from social security 
starting in the early 1970s fit well with the recessions of the mid 1970s and the early 1980s. 39 
 
for all of the regressions shown in the table.  The estimated coefficient of the lagged Romer-
Romer variable is negative, -1.08 (s.e.=0.57), but statistically significant only with a p-value of 
0.06.
27  If we add an additional lag, the estimated coefficient on the first lag changes little, and 
that on the second lag is statistically insignificantly different from zero, -0.48 (0.55).  This 
timing—the principal negative effect appearing with a one-year lag—is broadly consistent with 
the results of Romer and Romer (2009, Figure 5) using quarterly data. 
  Column 3 of Table 7 includes simultaneously the first lags of the changes in the AMTR 
and the Romer-Romer exogenous tax-change variable.  The estimated coefficient of the AMTR 
variable, -0.43 (s.e.=0.24), is significantly negative with a p-value of 0.07, and that on the 
Romer-Romer variable, -0.56 (0.62), differs insignificantly from zero.  The two variables are 
jointly significant with a p-value of 0.029. 
  As mentioned before, the problem with estimating contemporaneous effects of tax 
variables is endogeneity.  If we add the current year’s change in the AMTR to the equation in 
Table 7, column 1, and also include this variable on the instrument list, we get that the estimated 
coefficient on the current change has the “wrong” sign, 0.39 (s.e.=0.24), whereas that on the 
lagged change is still significantly negative, -0.68 (0.23).  The positive coefficient on the 
contemporaneous change likely reflects the endogenous determination of the AMTR.  If we 
modify the instrument list to replace the current change in AMTR by the change based on the 
current year’s tax law and the prior year’s incomes,
28 the estimated coefficients do not change 
                                                 
27The estimated coefficient becomes significantly negative at the 0.05 level, -1.11 (s.e.=0.47), if we enter instead the 
lagged value of the Romer-Romer intended change in overall federal tax revenue, with the exogenous part still on 
the instrument list.   
28We constructed this variable, using the NBER’s TAXSIM program, for the federal individual income tax and 
social security from 1967 to 2006.  We formed an instrument by taking the AMTR computed from the current tax 
law and the prior year’s incomes for the federal income tax and social security and subtracting the actual AMTR for 
these taxes from the previous year.  (This procedure assumes a value of zero for the change in the AMTR from state 
income taxes.)  For 1950-66, the instrument takes on the constant value -0.0005, which is the median change from 
1950 to 2006.  In a regression for 1950-2006 of the change in the AMTR on all of the instruments, the estimated 40 
 
much:  0.36 (0.30) on the current change and -0.67 (0.24) on the lag.  The likely problem is that 
this instrument still leaves the endogeneity associated with legislated changes in the tax structure.   
  Column 4 of Table 7 includes the contemporaneous and lagged AMTR changes in the 
equation and adds as an instrument the contemporaneous Romer-Romer exogenous tax-change 
variable.
29  The estimated coefficients on the AMTR variables are 0.12 (s.e.=0.47) on the 
contemporaneous value and -0.58 (0.28) on the lag.  The near-zero coefficient on the 
contemporaneous variable likely arises because the Romer-Romer variable eliminates much, but 
perhaps not all, of the endogenous legislative response.  In any event, we still find a significantly 
negative effect from the change in the AMTR only with a one-year lag.  Column 5 of the table 
shows that the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous tax change is also close to zero 
when the equation includes the current and lagged values of the Romer-Romer variable, rather 
than the AMTR variable. 
  Since the spirit of the Romer-Romer analysis is to look for income effects from federal-
tax changes, it seems appropriate not to include their variable directly in the GDP equation but 
rather to include the change in overall federal revenue and then use their exogenous tax-change 
measure as an instrument.  Column 6 of Table 7 includes the first lag of the change in a variable 
based on total federal revenue (the change in per capita real federal revenue expressed as a ratio 
to the previous year’s per capita real GDP).  This form implies that the coefficient on the federal-
revenue variable directly reveals the “tax multiplier.”  The estimated coefficient, -0.46 
(s.e.=0.27), is negative but statistically significantly different from zero only with a p-value of 
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficient on the newly constructed variable is 1.05 (s.e.=0.11), with a t-statistic of 9.2.  The F-statistic for the four 
excluded instruments is 24.  Therefore, weak instruments are not a problem here. 
29In a regression for 1950-2006 of the change in the AMTR on all of the instruments, the estimated coefficient on 
the contemporaneous Romer-Romer variable is 1.05 (s.e.=0.31), implying a t-statistic of 3.4.  The F-statistic for the 
four excluded instruments is 4.2, indicating that weak instruments might be a problem here.  41 
 
0.09.  If we add a second lag of the federal-revenue variable, the estimated coefficient of the first 
lag changes little, and that on the second lag is close to zero, 0.03 (0.27).   
  Column 7 of Table 7 includes simultaneously the first lags of the changes in the AMTR 
and the federal-revenue variable.  In this specification, the estimated coefficient of the AMTR 
variable, -0.45 (s.e.=0.24),  is significantly negative with a p-value of 0.07, whereas that on the 
federal-revenue variable, -0.17 (0.30), differs insignificantly from zero.  Thus, the results prefer 
the AMTR variable to the measure of federal revenue. 
  We also estimated equations that include the contemporaneous change in the federal-
revenue variable, while including the contemporaneous Romer-Romer exogenous tax-change 
variable as an instrument.  If we add these variables to the specification in Table 7, column 6, the 
estimated coefficients are 0.74 (s.e.=0.51) on the contemporaneous federal-revenue variable and 
-0.51 (0.22) on the lagged value.  These variables are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.04.  
However, if we reinsert the lagged change in the AMTR into the equation, we get a significantly 
negative coefficient on this variable, -0.42 (0.21), and an insignificant effect from the lagged 
federal-revenue variable, -0.23 (0.26).  Therefore, the lagged federal-revenue variable seems just 
to have been proxying for the lagged change in the AMTR.  If we eliminate the lagged federal-
revenue variable, as in column 8 of Table 7, we get the usual significantly negative coefficient on 
the lagged AMTR, -0.52 (0.18), and a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient on the 
contemporaneous federal-revenue variable, 0.46 (0.53).  A positive coefficient on the 
contemporaneous change in federal tax revenue (if it were statistically significant) could be 
interpreted in terms of wealth effects—lower wealth from higher anticipated future government 
spending spurring greater work effort. 42 
 
  The bottom line is that the post-1950 U.S. data provide reasonably clear statistical 
evidence for a negative effect of increases in the average marginal income-tax rate, AMTR, on 
GDP.  These effects show up with a one-year lag, but this apparently delayed response may 
reflect mainly the dependence of the constructed AMTR on changes to the tax structure that 
occur at any time within a calendar year.  We find no evidence for important effects 
contemporaneously or at a two-year lag.  Once we hold constant the lagged change in the 
AMTR, we find no statistically significant effects from variables that measure exogenous 
changes in federal tax revenue—and are, therefore, likely to pick up wealth effects.  In contrast, 
with these revenue variables included, the lagged change in the AMTR still has at least a 
marginally significant negative effect on GDP.  We therefore conclude that the main effects from 
tax changes on GDP likely involve substitution effects, rather than wealth effects. 
VII.  Concluding Observations 
  For samples that include WWII, the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending 
is 0.4-0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6-0.7 over two years.  If the change in defense spending is 
“permanent” (gauged by Ramey’s defense-news variable), the multipliers are higher by 0.1-0.2.   
These multipliers are all significantly less than one and apply for given average marginal 
income-tax rates.  In contrast, we lack reliable estimates of multipliers for non-defense 
purchases, because the lack of good instruments makes it infeasible to isolate the direction of 
causation between these purchases and GDP. 
  Since the estimated defense-spending multiplier is less than one, a rise in defense 
spending is estimated to crowd out other components of GDP.  The main crowding out applies to 
investment, broadly defined to include purchases of consumer durables, but negative effects 
show up also for net exports.  In contrast, a permanent increase in defense spending has less of a 43 
 
negative effect on investment but significantly depresses non-defense government purchases.  
Estimated effects of temporary or permanent defense spending on consumer expenditure on non-
durables and services are small and statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
   The post-1950 sample reveals significantly negative effects on GDP from increases in 
the average marginal income-tax rate, AMTR.  When interpreted as a tax multiplier (using the 
historical association between changes in federal revenue and changes in the AMTR), the value 
is around -1.1.  However, these tax-rate effects are less reliably estimated in long samples.  Once 
we hold constant the behavior of the AMTR, we find no statistically significant effects on GDP 
in the post-1950 sample from “exogenous” movements in federal revenue (using the Romer-
Romer exogenous federal tax change).  In contrast, when revenue is held constant, we still find at 
least marginally significant negative effects on GDP from increases in the AMTR.  Thus, 
changes in taxes seem to influence GDP mainly through substitution effects, rather than wealth 
effects. 
  If higher defense spending goes along with higher federal revenue and correspondingly 
higher marginal tax rates, we have to factor in the negative tax multiplier, estimated to be around 
-1.1.  Since the estimated expenditure multipliers for given tax rates were significantly less than 
one, the full effect from greater defense spending and correspondingly higher taxes is to reduce 
GDP; that is, the estimated balanced-budget multiplier is negative. 
  We are presently applying the methodology to long-term macroeconomic data for other 
countries.
30  However, the U.S. evidence for isolating defense-spending multipliers works well 
because the main wars involved dramatic variations in defense outlays but little destruction of 
                                                 
30Almunia, et al (2010) provide suggestive evidence that defense-spending multipliers are positive in a panel of 27 
countries for 1925-1939.  The results (Table 2) are hard to interpret because the growth rate of defense spending is 
used as an instrument for the growth rate of government expenditure, which includes transfers and interest payments 
and lacks a consistent definition across countries in terms of central versus total government.  44 
 
domestic capital stock and only moderate loss of American life.  The massive destruction during 
the world wars for many other countries would preclude a similar analysis; that is, adverse 
supply shocks would confound the demand effects from greater government spending. 
  Promising cases that seem analogous to the U.S. experience are Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and South Africa.  These cases are especially interesting because the entry dates into 
the world wars, 1914 and 1939, are earlier than the U.S. dates.  In particular, the earlier entry into 
WWII means that the dramatic increases in defense spending took place in the context of 
unemployment rates than were higher than those in the United States.  For example, for Canada, 
the sharp rise in defense spending in 1940 matches up with an unemployment rate of 14.1% in 
1939.  Therefore, the four countries should provide clearer evidence about whether the defense-
spending multiplier interacts with the amount of slack in the economy.  However, further 
research will be required to assess the feasibility of constructing time series for these countries 
on defense news and average marginal income-tax rates.  These variables featured prominently 
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Table 1  Data on Average Marginal Income-Tax Rates 












1912 0.000  0.000  0.000  [0.0001] 
1913 0.003  0.003  0.000  [0.0001] 
1914 0.005  0.005  0.000  [0.0002] 
1915 0.007  0.007  0.000  [0.0002] 
1916 0.013  0.013  0.000  [0.0003] 
1917 0.037  0.037  0.000  [0.0003] 
1918 0.054  0.054  0.000  [0.0004] 
1919 0.052  0.052  0.000  [0.0004] 
1920 0.046  0.046  0.000  [0.0005] 
1921 0.043  0.042  0.000  [0.0005] 
1922 0.047  0.046  0.000  [0.0006] 
1923 0.034  0.033  0.000  [0.0006] 
1924 0.036  0.035  0.000  [0.0007] 
1925 0.031  0.030  0.000  [0.0007] 
1926 0.029  0.028  0.000  [0.0007] 
1927 0.033  0.032  0.000  [0.0008] 
1928 0.042  0.041  0.000  [0.0008] 
1929 0.036  0.035  0.000  0.0009 
1930 0.024  0.023  0.000  0.0007 
1931 0.018  0.017  0.000  0.0006 
1932 0.030  0.029  0.000  0.0006 
1933 0.032  0.031  0.000  0.0015 
1934 0.036  0.034  0.000  0.0018 
1935 0.041  0.038  0.000  0.0028 
1936 0.055  0.052  0.000  0.0032 
1937 0.058  0.046  0.009  0.0035 
1938 0.046  0.034  0.009  0.0032 
1939 0.051  0.038  0.009  0.0036 
1940 0.069  0.056  0.009  0.0038 
1941 0.126  0.113  0.009  0.0038 
1942 0.205  0.192  0.008  0.0047 
1943 0.221  0.209  0.007  0.0048 
1944 0.263  0.252  0.006  0.0052 
1945 0.268  0.257  0.006  0.0047 
1946 0.238  0.226  0.007  0.0052 
1947 0.238  0.226  0.006  0.0056 
1948 0.193  0.180  0.006  0.0072 
1949 0.187  0.175  0.005  0.0072 
1950 0.211  0.196  0.007  0.0079 
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Table 1, continued 












1951 0.248  0.231  0.009  0.0085 
1952 0.268  0.251  0.008  0.0086 
1953 0.266  0.249  0.008  0.0086 
1954 0.241  0.222  0.010  0.0087 
1955 0.250  0.228  0.012  0.0098 
1956 0.254  0.232  0.012  0.0101 
1957 0.255  0.232  0.013  0.0104 
1958 0.253  0.229  0.013  0.0114 
1959 0.265  0.236  0.016  0.0130 
1960 0.265  0.234  0.018  0.0129 
1961 0.270  0.240  0.017  0.0132 
1962 0.275  0.244  0.017  0.0142 
1963 0.280  0.247  0.018  0.0146 
1964 0.253  0.221  0.017  0.0155 
1965 0.244  0.212  0.016  0.0164 
1966 0.251  0.212  0.022  0.0173 
1967 0.256  0.215  0.021  0.0202 
1968 0.286  0.238  0.026  0.0229 
1969 0.298  0.250  0.024  0.0245 
1970 0.286  0.237  0.022  0.0270 
1971 0.278  0.227  0.022  0.0291 
1972 0.289  0.231  0.025  0.0332 
1973 0.305  0.239  0.034  0.0327 
1974 0.325  0.247  0.042  0.0354 
1975 0.333  0.254  0.043  0.0370 
1976 0.340  0.257  0.043  0.0391 
1977 0.361  0.277  0.043  0.0410 
1978 0.369  0.284  0.043  0.0421 
1979 0.384  0.273  0.068  0.0420 
1980 0.400  0.286  0.072  0.0412 
1981 0.418  0.294  0.084  0.0403 
1982 0.404  0.275  0.087  0.0414 
1983 0.391  0.256  0.091  0.0450 
1984 0.393  0.254  0.095  0.0446 
1985 0.399  0.260  0.095  0.0442 
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Table 1, continued 












1986 0.401  0.259  0.097  0.0447 
1987 0.375  0.237  0.096  0.0422 
1988 0.356  0.218  0.097  0.0418 
1989 0.360  0.218  0.100  0.0421 
1990 0.362  0.217  0.102  0.0421 
1991 0.371  0.219  0.108  0.0438 
1992 0.369  0.217  0.108  0.0448 
1993 0.379  0.224  0.110  0.0446 
1994 0.385  0.230  0.111  0.0446 
1995 0.386  0.232  0.109  0.0445 
1996 0.385  0.235  0.107  0.0441 
1997 0.386  0.237  0.105  0.0440 
1998 0.387  0.239  0.104  0.0440 
1999 0.390  0.243  0.103  0.0442 
2000 0.392  0.247  0.101  0.0442 
2001 0.385  0.238  0.103  0.0440 
2002 0.380  0.231  0.105  0.0436 
2003 0.359  0.211  0.104  0.0441 
2004 0.358  0.213  0.102  0.0433 
2005 0.351  0.216  0.092  0.0433 
2006 0.353  0.217  0.093  0.0432 
 
Note:  See the text on the construction of average (income-weighted) marginal tax rates for the 
federal individual income tax, social-security payroll tax, and state income taxes.  Values shown 
in brackets for state income taxes for 1912-28 are interpolations.  The total is the sum of the 
three pieces.  The construction of these data is detailed in an appendix posted at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro. 
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Table 2  Equations for GDP Growth,  
Various Samples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Starting  date  1950 1939 1930 1917 1954 




























































p-value, defense variables  0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.47 
R
2  0.48 0.82 0.75 0.66 0.45 
σ  0.017 0.019 0.027 0.030 0.018 
 
*Significant at 0.05 level.  **Significant at 0.01 level. 
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Notes to Table 2 
 
  Data are annual from the starting year shown through 2006.  The dependent variable is 
the change from the previous year in per capita real GDP divided by the previous year’s per 
capita real GDP.  Data on per capita real GDP are from Barro and Ursua (2008), who use BEA 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis) data since 1929 and pre-1929 information from Balke and 
Gordon (1989).  The underlying population numbers include U.S. military overseas.  Δg: defense 
is the change from the previous year in per capita real defense spending (nominal spending 
divided by the GDP deflator) divided by the previous year’s per capita real GDP.  Data since 
1929 on defense outlays are from BEA, and pre-1929 data are from Kendrick (1961).  The 
lagged value of this variable, Δg: defense (-1), is also included.  Δg*: defense news is from 
Ramey (2009a, Table 2; 2009b), who uses news sources to estimate the present discounted 
nominal value of expected changes in defense spending applying in most cases over the next 
3-to-5 years.  Her data were expressed as ratios to the prior year’s nominal GDP.  Data since 
1929 on U, the unemployment rate, are from BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics).  We adjusted the 
BLS values from 1933 to 1943 to classify federal emergency workers as employed, as discussed 
in Darby (1976).  Values before 1929 are from Romer (1986, Table 9).  Δτ is the change from 
the previous year in the average marginal income-tax rate from federal and state income taxes 
and social security, as shown in Table 1.  The yield spread is the difference between the yield on 
long-term Baa corporate bonds and that on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.  Before 1919, the 
spread is estimated from data on long-term Aaa corporate bonds.  The square of the spread 
appears in the equations.  Data on yields are from Moody’s, as reported on the website of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
  Estimation is by two-stage least-squares, using as instruments all of the independent 
variables in this table, except for the square of the yield spread, which is replaced by its lagged 
value.  The instrument list also contains the first lag of the dependent variable.  The p-value is for 
a test that the coefficients are all zero for the three variables related to defense spending.  
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Table 3  More Results on Government Purchases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Starting  date  1950 1939 1930 1917 1950 1950 

















































































Δ(GM sales)  -- -- -- --  3.66** 
(0.86) 
-- 
Δ(GE sales)  -- -- -- -- --  17.6** 
(4.7) 
R
2  0.54 0.82 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.57 
σ  0.017 0.019 0.027 0.030 0.015 0.016 
 
*Significant at 0.05 level.  **Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Note:  See the notes to Table 2.  The first four columns include the variable Δg: non-defense, 
which is the change from the previous year in per capita real non-defense government purchases 
(nominal purchases divided by the GDP deflator) for all levels of government, divided by the 
previous year’s per capita real GDP.  Data since 1929 on non-defense government purchases are 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Pre-1929 data are from Kendrick (1961).  The variable Δg: 
non-defense is included in the instrument lists for the first four columns.  Δ(GM sales) is the 
change from the previous year in per capita real net sales of General Motors Corporation, 
expressed as a ratio to the previous year’s per capita real GDP.  Real net sales are nominal sales 
divided by the GDP deflator.  This variable is included in the instrument list for column 5.  Δ(GE 
sales), in column 6, is treated analogously, based on net sales of General Electric Corporation.  
The GM and GE data come from annual reports of the two companies. 
 




Predicted Effects from Defense Spending on Components of GDP 
 
 
  predicted effect on: 




g: defense  + -  -  -  - 
g*: defense news  + -  +  -  + 
 
 
Note:  The table considers in the left-most column increases in current defense spending, g, or in 
news about future defense spending, g*.  The five columns to the right show the signs of the 
predicted changes in GDP and its four components:  private consumption, gross private domestic 
investment, non-defense government purchases, and net exports.  The effects on non-defense 
government purchases follow if we view these purchases as primarily consumption, rather than 
investment.  In our empirical application, we identify consumption with personal consumer 
expenditure on non-durables and services, and we consider consumer expenditure on durables as 
a form of investment. 
 
 




Table 5  Effects on Components of GDP 
Sample:  1950-2006 
Dependent variable:  Δ(c: non-dur)  Δ(c: dur)  Δ(invest)  Δ(g: non-def)  Δ(x-m) 





























































2, σ  0.25, 0.006  0.45, 0.005  0.54, 0.012  0.23, 0.003  0.30, 0.005 
Sample:  1939-2006 





























































2, σ  0.43, 0.007  0.59, 0.005  0.62, 0.014  0.54, 0.004  0.30, 0.007 
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Table 5, continued 
Sample:  1930-2006 
Dependent variable:  Δ(c: non-dur)  Δ(c: dur)  Δ(invest)  Δ(g: non-def)  Δ(x-m) 





























































2, σ  0.42, 0.012  0.59, 0.006  0.62, 0.016  0.33, 0.005  0.30, 0.006 
 
 
*Significant at 0.05 level.  **Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
Notes:  These results correspond to Table 2, except for the specifications of the dependent 
variables, which are now based on components of GDP.  For the non-durables and services part 
of personal consumer expenditure, Δ(c: non-dur), the dependent variable equals the change in per 
capita real expenditure (nominal expenditure divided by the GDP deflator), expressed as a ratio 
to the previous year’s per capita real GDP.  The same approach applies to purchases of consumer 
durables, Δ(c: dur), gross private domestic investment, Δ(invest), non-defense government 
purchases by all levels of government, Δ(g: non-def), and net exports, Δ(x-m).  Data since 1929 
on components of GDP are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.      56 
 
Table 6  Results Using Total Government Purchases 
  (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Starting date  1950  1939  1930  1917 
















































p-value, defense variables  0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2  0.52 0.82 0.76 0.67 
σ  0.017 0.019 0.026 0.030 
 
*Significant at 0.05 level.  **Significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Note:  These results correspond to Table 2, except that the variable Δg now refers to total 
government purchases, rather than defense outlays.  The instruments are the same as those used 
in Table 2, except that the lagged change in total government purchases appears instead of the 
lagged change in defense spending.   57 
 
 
Table 7  More Results on Taxes, 1950-2006
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 










































































Δτ  -- -- --  0.12 
(0.47) 
-- -- -- -- 
Romers: exogenous 







-- -- -- 
Romers: exogenous 
   Δtax/Y(-1) 
-- -- -- --  -0.03 
(0.55) 
-- -- -- 





Δ(fed rev.)/Y(-1)  -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0.46 
(0.53) 
















p-value: τ  0.015 -- 0.074  0.039 --  -- 0.070  0.006 
p-value: Romers  --  0.063  0.37 -- 0.17 --  --  -- 
p-value: fed. revenue  -- -- -- -- --  0.091  0.56  0.39 
p-value: all tax vars.  0.015 0.063 0.029 0.039  0.17  0.091 0.037 0.010 
R
2  0.49 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.63 
σ  0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.015 
 
*Significant at 0.05 level.  **Significant at 0.01 level. 
Note:  See the notes to Table 2.  Data are annual from 1950 through 2006.  The equations in 
columns 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 include the lag of the change in the average marginal income-tax rate, τ.  
Column 4 adds the contemporaneous value of Δτ.  Columns 2, 3, and 5 include the lag of the 
Romer and Romer (2008, Table 1, columns 1-4) exogenous tax-change variable described in the 
text.  Column 5 adds the contemporaneous value of this variable.  Columns 6 and 7 include the 
lagged value of the variable Δ(federal taxes)/Y(-1), which is the change in per capita real federal 
revenue (total nominal receipts from BEA divided by the GDP deflator), expressed as a ratio to 
the previous year’s per capita real GDP.  Column 8 has the contemporaneous value of this 
variable.  The instrument list for all equations includes Δg: defense, Δg: defense (-1), Δg*: 
defense news, U(-1), Δτ(-1), the first lags of the dependent variable and the square of the yield 
spread, and the first lag of the Romer-Romer exogenous tax-change variable.  Columns 4, 5, 
and 8 add the contemporaneous Romer-Romer variable.  Columns 6-8 add the lagged change in 






Changes in Defense and Non-Defense Government Purchases, 1914-2006 
(expressed as ratios to the previous year’s GDP) 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows the change in per capita real government purchases (nominal purchases 
divided by the GDP deflator), expressed as a ratio to the prior year’s per capita real GDP.  The 
blue graph is for defense purchases, and the red graph is for non-defense purchases by all levels 
of government.  The data on government purchases since 1929 are from Bureau of Economic 
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Defense-News Variable, 1913-2008 
 
Note:  From 1939 to 2008, the variable is the annual counter-part of Ramey’s (2009a, Table 2) 
measure of the present value of expected future nominal defense spending, expressed as a ratio to 
the prior year’s nominal GDP.  Values from 1913 to 1938 are rough estimates, described in 
section II of the text.  We use the defense-news variable to measure (  
        
   )/yt-1 in 













Average Marginal Income-Tax Rates, 1912-2006 
 
 
Note:  The red graph is for the federal individual income tax, the green graph for the social-
security payroll tax (FICA), and the black graph for state income taxes.  The blue graph is the 
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Federal Income Tax
Social-Security Tax (FICA)
State Income Taxes